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The studies appeared in literature may be roughly classified in two major groups, on the basis of the approach used to deal with the changes in the structure of the system. These studies consider the definition and the solution of either a global model including all phases as proposed in [3, 4, 7, 81 or the definition of a distinct model for each phase of the system and a separate evaluation for each of these models as in 11, 2, 9, 101. The definition of a single model that takes into account all the possible behaviours of the system in the different phases allows one to easily consider the dependencies among the phases. This approach also allows exploitation of similarities among phases to obtain a compact model in which all the phases are properly "embedded". The main disadvantage of the single model approach is the lack of reusability. A new model needs to be built if the behaviour of the system in any phase is changed or if the phase order is changed. Moreover, a relevant effort may be needed to define and solve, using aut@ matic tools, the overall model of the system. On the contrary, a separate modelling and evaluation of each phase allows a better management of the complexity of the analysis, and to reuse previously built models of the phases. Furthermore, this approach permits i) to focus, inside each phase, on the most interesting behaviours to be analysed for the system dependability viewpoint, ii) to deal with smaller state space models, iii) an easier characterisation of the differences among phases, as different failure rates and different configuration requirements. However, this approach requires an explicit identification and treatment of the dependencies among phases.
Our approach is based on a hierarchical and modular methodology of modelling and evaluation. Two levels of modelling are here considered. At the upper level we build a single model for the whole mission, characterised by a sequence of phases without detailing the behaviour of the system inside each phase. This allows to easily model a variety of mission scenarios by sequencing the phases in different ways. Moreover, we can consider missions in which some phases may be skipped, thus allowing a probabilistic selection of alternative paths for the mission profile. Such probabilistic choice of the mission has not yet been considered in literature, to the best of our knowledge. The parameters to be used in the upper level model are obtained by solving the lower level models. These models (one for each phase) detail the behaviour of the system inside phases and are built and solved separately from each other. This way, if a phase is repeated during the mission, a model for that phase can be built once and reused when needed. The transition to a new phase is represented with an additional modelling, to explicitly take into account the dependencies among phases.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we describe the system and characterise the missions. Our modelling approach is presented and discussed in Section 3. We detail the assumptions used to build the models and show the two levels of the hierarchy, together with the models introduced to represent the dependencies among phases. In Section 4 we present the results of a numerical evaluation aimed at assessing the unreliability of the system. Finally, conclusions are given in Section 5.
System description and mission profile
We consider a spacecraft for scientific aims, whose mission encompasses several periods or phases. The phases for the spacecraft typical mission include: launch, hibernation, and operational phases called here planet, asteroid and comet. The launch phase is needed for the transport outside the Earth's orbit and no particular activity is performed by the control system of the spacecraft itself during this phase. The hibernation is a long dormancy period usually entered for cruise navigation, characterised by a minimal level of activity. The spacecraft stays in hibernation for most of the mission, and only leaves it for short time periods, in which the other operational phases are performed. For instance, during the planet phase the spacecraft performs vital orbit manoeuvres to increase its speed. Afterwards, it enters a new hibernation phase till the next wake-up.
To explain our modelling approach we take as example a hypothetical mission composed by the following sequence of phases: launching, hibernation, planet, hibernation, asteroid, hibernation, comet. Such a mission profile is suitable to show many of the interesting features of our modelling approach to the phased mission space applications; any other mission profile may be analysed with our proposed modelling framework. Among the operational phases, the comet is considered the main goal of the mission, and the asteroid is a secondary goal (in both relevant scientific observations are conducted). Such goals are defined during the design of the spacecraft mission, and the possible phases as well as their duration are pre-planned on ground. However, a certain level of flexibility is foreseen: some phases could be skipped if their execution would risk to endanger important activities to be pursued in the future. We show how our modelling approach is able to account for this feature by assuming in the considered example that the asteroid phase is skipped if the current spacecraft hardware configuration is already degraded due to component failures experienced in the past. Performing this secondary goal might yield to an unreliable execution of the more important comet phase. Launching and hibernation are both classified as non-operational phases because of the low level of activity, while the operational phases, due to the critical activities performed therein, are characterised by stronger dependability requirements. In our example the spacecraft is thus equipped with four redundant identical channels of computation to meet dependability requirements of the various phases. Each phase uses only those channels that are necessary on the basis of such requirements. The unused channels are turned off and act as cold spares. Whenever any fault occurs in an active channel, that channel is removed from the pool of active ones. However, since most of the faults are transient, after a time that is not known in advance the channel can be in some sense "repaired". Actually, such a repair is due to the physical behaviour of electronic components: some failed components may change their internal state and get over the faulty state.
We introduce the notation ( a , s , f ) to denote the possible system configurations: the value a represents the number of active channels, the value s represents the number of spare channels, while f is that of failed ones. With this notation in mind, we now explain the behaviour of the system inside each phase.
A double redundancy is considered ideal for the hibernation and launching phases; the best working configuration of these phases would hence have two active channels and two spares. However, the system can also work with a single channel, only during spare insertion or when waiting for reparation. The diagram of the Figure 1 reports the possible configurations of the non-operational phases and the transitions among configurations.
When a channel fails (a fault happens), that channel is isolated and the insertion of a spare channel is tried, if there is still an available one. The spare insertion task can succeed (edge marked reconfiguration OK) or fail (edge marked rec. failed). If the spare insertion of a channel fails, then that channel becomes failed. When a failed channel is repaired, if there is only another one active channel then the new available channel becomes active, otherwise it be-comes a spare. The rep ation step can therefore include or exclude the spare inse tion, depending on the current configuration of the syste i "'
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Modelling approach and assumptions
Our approach to the phased-mission systems is based on the hierarchical methodology proposed for railway applications in [6] and on the specific features of space applications. Similar hierarchical modelling methodologies have also been proposed by Meyer et al. in [ 5 ] , and by Tai et. al. in [ 1 1 1. The hierarchical approach represents a suitable mean to master the complexity of the analysis and to allow a more refined modelling of many features. We build a two level hierarchical model: the upper level describes the mission of the spacecraft as a sequence of phases (each phase is collapsed into a single event), the lower level explores the behaviour of system architecture inside the different phases.
Channels are considered as black-boxes. Each of them could be composed by more modules, and could be analysed by increasing the number of the levels as described in [6]. The models of the new levels should deal with the internal behaviour of each channel taking into account the interactions among its components. At this stage we focus on the specific characteristics of the phased missions, without detailing such internal analysis of the channels. The assumptions we used are:
All the channels are assumed to exhibit the same stochastic behaviour regarding fault occurrences. Channels fail independently from each other. The fault occurrence and repair times for a channel are modelled as random variables with exponential probability distribution with rates h and p, respectively. Only active channels may fail while spare do not fail. Constant failure and repair rates of the channels within a phase are assumed. However, the same channel can have different failure rates in different phase (mainly to reflect the different environmental stress conditions that the spacecraft may experience). Faults affecting channels are detected with probability 1 by self-checking tools and voting mechanisms. The isolation of a faulty channel and the spare insertion (reconfiguration) take a negligible amount of time.
The spare insertion activity can succeed or fail with a probability c and (1 -c ) , respectively, while the isolation of a faulty channel is always performed correctly. The turning off of active channels is always successfully performed and has zero duration.
Upper level
The upper level describes the mission of the spacecraft as sequences of phases. Since all the phases have a pre-de-fined time duration we build this model using a transient Discrete Time Markov Chain (DT-MC). Figure 3 shows the upper level model for the example of mission profile we use to explain our approach. In this model each phase is represented by a single state; launch is the initial state. Two absorbing states model the loss and the success of the mission. Edges marked F, and S, leaving each non-absorbing state represent the probability that during phase "*" any event occurs which leads to a loss of the mission, and the probability that the system can start a new phase after the current one has successfully completed, respectively. Several paths can be identified, each of them corresponding to a different mission history, depending on the probabilities of failing before the end of the mission and of skipping the asteroid phase. The probabilities on the arcs, including that of selecting an alternative path (asteroid is skipped), are obtained from the lower level.
Figure 3: Mission as a phase sequencing
Note that state Hibernation has three outgoing arcs, one representing the failure of the mission (labelled F H 2 ) , the other two, marked S H 2 ( I -P ) and S,,P , represent the fact that the asteroid phase is executed or is aborted, respectively. In the latter case, the system remains in hibernation. Note that the same system architectural components are used in all the phases and this implies that the events (e.g. configuration degrading) occurred in the previous phases of the mission affect the behaviour of the spacecraft in the current phase. This fact introduces stochastic dependencies among the various phases. Such dependencies are not evident from the upper level model, but are properly taken into account by the models of the lower level.
Lower level
The lower level explores the behaviour of the system architecture inside the different phases. The models of the single phases are built by using Continuous Time Markov Chains (CT-MC). Each phase is modelled separately. The dependencies among successive phases are addressed explicitly through the definition of separate sub models for phase changes. Thus our approach permits to focus on these important issues in a modular and explicit way. Since the spare insertion activity has a negligible duration (assumption 7), the configurations ( I , 2, I ) and ( I , l , 2) shown in Figure 1 represent unstable states of the system (i.e. states in which the system remains for a negligible amount of time just during reconfiguration). These vanishing configurations are obviously not present in the Markov model in Figure 4 . The fault and reparation arrows leaving those unstable configurations in Figure 1 are thus deleted because there is not sojourn time associated with them. Similarly, from the specification given by Figure 2 , a CT-MC model can be defined to describe the behaviour of the system within the operational phases. Due to the limited space, that model is not reported here.
Deterministic transitions among phases.
To take into account the dependencies among consecutive phases we build particular sub models that we call transitions. They map the configurations at the end of a phase into the initial configurations of the new phase, accounting for the configuration requirements of the next phase. Such initial probability distribution is normalised with respect to the probability of starting the new phase. The transition also considers possible spare insertions (instantaneous activities following assumption 7). Since the spare insertion may fail, a mission loss can also occur during the transition. The probability of this failure is added to that of failing during the preceding phase. Hence, at the upper level the probability of failure of each phase includes the probability of failing during the transition.
In this subsection we describe the deterministic transitions to phases that cannot be skipped during the mission. As an example, we consider the transition from any hibernation phase to any operational phase. The deterministic transitions between other phases show similar features so they are omitted for sake of brevity. ibernation phase the system has to three active channels by insertphase if and only if it has the new phase requires fails during the next phase cannot be nels, and the last term during the hibernation Figure 5 only shcws phase that have non-zero probability of operational
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3 2 3 Problabilistic trahsitions among phases. In general, conditions for deciding how a mission has to continue, i.e. which phase to perfo next, can be related to current system configuration. In ur example, the transition from hibernation to asteroid (s condary goal of the mission) takes places only if the syst m is in a configuration such that it does not ri:sk to loose I t e main goal of the mission (comet), that is no channel is faulty. Otherwise the system remains in hibernation (that we model as a new phase). Actually this choice is used just to show how our approach can address this feature. Let tH2 denote the finish time of the hibernation phase preceding the asteroid phase, as shown in Figure 3 . The probabilities FH2 of failure and SH2 of success of hibernation phase are evaluated as for the transition from the launching to hibernation. The probability P of skipping the asteroid phase is given by:
Note that probability P is conditioned with respect to probability SH2 of succeeding in the hibernation phase. The probability of performing the asteroid is given by:
The initial probability of the asteroid phase is given by:
and of the new hibernation phase: o , n~l , , (~) , n : o , 2 ( o ) , n~o , 3 (~) ,~) 
Considerations on the proposed approach
The hierarchical framework makes both the modelling and evaluation simpler. The modelling involves small and easyto-define models while the evaluation performed individually for each model in a bottom up fashion does not impose heavy requirements to the automatic tools used. The upper level can easily describe missions composed by any combination of phases with pre-planned duration of the phases, thus allowing to analyse various mission profiles by using a high abstraction level modelling. Missions may include probabilistic choices of the next phases to be performed, thus introducing a more flexible and dynamic planning of the mission goals. The mission models can hence have a tree configuration.
Moreover, the upper level allows to perform a sensitivity analysis to understand which phases are more critical for the success of a specific mission. Once that such bottleneck phases are identified, it is possible to establish requirements on the dependability figures of each single phase to guarantee that the mission target is reached.
Many different missions can be modelled and analysed by reusing and composing models of the lower level which describe individual phases and deterministic as well as probabilistic transitions among phases. Indeed, each single phase model and phase transition model is quite simple compared to that of the whole mission, and can be evaluated at a low computational cost by using general purpose tools. This modularity allows very easily to change assumptions or conditions ruling a phase change requiring to change just a few sub models. 
Evaluation step

Fault occurrence rate
We conduct a numerical evaluation of the system unreliability for the specific mission we selected as our running example, described by the DT-MC in Figure 3 , by using the models and related information reported in the previous paragraphs. The unreliability is defined as the probability that the main goal of the mission (the comet phase) is not successfully performed.
The evaluation follows a bottom up procedure. The phase models of the lower level are sequentially solved to obtain the transient state probability distribution at the phase finish time, from which the parameters to instanciate the upper level model are derived. The measure of interest is obtained by solving the upper level model. To solve the model of the first phase (launch in the considered mission), we assume that the mission starts with all non-faulty channels. An initial probability distribution that assigns probability 1 to the state (2,2,0) of the model in Figure 4 is thus considered. The launch phase is thus solved by evaluating its state probability distribution Z L ( t L ) at the time t , at which the phase ends. Then solving the transition model we obtain the initial state probability distributioli of the next phase (hibernation) and values for the parameters S, and F, to be reported at the upper level model, as described in the previous section. In a similar way all the successive phases are solved, and all the parameters needed by the upper level model are derived. The unreliability is very easily obtained by evaluating the model of Figure 3 .
We used in the analytical evaluations the general purpose tool Mathematica'" because the Markov models are simple enough (three or five states). A high accuracy was used in the evaluation to avoid approximation errors due to the numerical solution techniques. The evaluation of transient state probability distribution within each phase model of lower level has been carried out with at least 100 digits of accuracy.
We considered ranges of values for the fault occurrence rate h, for the repair rate p (given in occurrence per Reparation rate Probability of successful spare insertion hour) and the probability c of successful spare insertion to instanciate the models of lower level. Various scenarios are thus evaluated for the different values of these parameters reported in Table 2, while Table 1 shows the phase duration, expressed in hours. Note that these values are just taken to show an example of evaluation; they do not represent a realistic mission.
Table 2: Markov models parameters
In a first scenario, we suppose that the failure rates, the repair rates and the probability of successful spare insertion c are the same for all the phases. Figure 7 : Unreliability with constant failure rates Figure 7 shows the probability of mission loss for different values of the failure rate h and of the repair rate p (spare insertion success probability c fixed to 0.9995). For these values the final probability is very sensitive even to small changes of the value of parameters h and F. As the fault occurrence rate assumes relatively very small and very large values, the effect of the repair rate becomes less significant.
In Figure 8 we report the results of an evaluation performed by considering different failure rates in the different phases. The channel failure rates could change due to increased environmental stresses. Values assigned to the failure rate h in the different phases are given in 
